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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/01/2008 Accident number: 482 
Accident time: 6:16 Accident Date: 21/08/2006 
Where it occurred: Schull Mountain, 
Schull Village, Rasht 
District 
Country: Tajikistan 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 31/08/2006 
ID original source: None Name of source: TMAC 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
rocks/stones 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 18/01/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: 39° 01' 12.2" E Map north: 070° 19' 33" N 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 




The report of this accident was made available in 2007. Its conversion to a DDAS file has led 
to some of the original formatting being lost. The text of the report is reproduced below, edited 
for anonymity. The original files, including all Annexes, are held on record. Text in [ ] is 
editorial. 
 
REPORT OF BOARD OF INQUIRY  
INTO DEMINING ACCIDENT AT SHULL MOUNTAIN ON 21 AUGUST 2006 
Dushanbe 31 August 2006 
References: 
• Map, General Staff Series 1984 J 42 33, Sheet no 10 42 033. 
• TMAC National Mine Action Standards Dated 29 October 2005. 
• [International demining group] SOP Part Four – Minefield Clearance. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1. As a result of a mine accident on 21 August 2006, in which demining operator [the Victim] 
was injured, a Board of Inquiry was convened by the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre to 
conduct an investigation on behalf of the government, in accordance with National Mine 
Action Standards. The initial report of this accident is shown at Annex A. 
2. The accident involved a Mine Clearance Team (MCT) from [International demining group] 
Dushanbe which was clearing an area of ground known to be mined, near the village of 
Shull, in the Rasht Valley region of Tajikistan.  
3. The Board of Inquiry comprised: 
a) Chair (CTA TMAC) [Name removed] 
b) Member (MOD)  [Name removed] 
c) Member (TMAC) [Name removed] 
d) Assistant [Name removed] (UNDP) 
4. [International demining group] appointed one observer to the Board of Inquiry – [Name 
removed]. 
5. A copy of the Board's Terms of Reference is attached at Annex B. 
 
SEQUENCE, DOCUMENTATION AND PROCEDURES OF TASKING 
6. TMAC designates this task as TS IS 58 and a Red Task Folder has been issued for the 
task, in accordance with normal procedures. The first Red Task Folder was issued 
complete with the Impact Survey form (Tajik - original), Suspect Hazardous Area (SHA) 
sketch map, Impact Survey form, topographical maps 1:50,000 and 1:100,000 scales, to 
[International demining group] Manager, [Name removed] on 20 May 2004 by TMAC 
IMSMA Officer, [Name removed]. The original task started on 25 May 2004. 
      Contents of Red Task Folder 
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• Impact Survey form: TMAC 
• Impact Survey form (Tajik, Original): [International demining group] 
• Topographic Maps 1:50,000 scale:TMAC 
• Topographic Maps 1:100,000 scale: TMAC 
• Suspect Hazardous Area (SHA) sketch map: [International demining group] 
 
7. Although it may be sometimes considered unusual to clear landmines from such areas as 
mountain tops, this mine clearance task is considered a priority because it is associated 
with grazing and farming land. The area provides approximately 300,000 square metres 
of ground for agriculture, based on the nearby village of Shull. The formal procedure for 
tasking was through the TMAC; the area was first identified after [International demining 
group]’s General Survey of the area in 2003/4 and the sequence of tasking originated 
from TMAC. 
8. From late 2005 until 2 July 2006, there was no demining activity in this location, initially 
due to seasonal poor weather conditions and then through delays in funding, which 
delayed the start of [International demining group]’s basic training courses for deminers. 
9. The team arrived on site on 2 July 2006 and set up camp on that day. Start-of-season re-
marking of the area and then clearance activities began on the next day, 03 July.  
10. At the time of the accident 18 deminers were at work along with two Section Leaders and 
one Team Leader. On the morning of the accident the deminers began working at 
0500hrs. [International demining group] working practices at this site require that each 
deminer normally works for fifty minutes before taking a ten-minute break and then re-
starting the work-break-work routine. This has been their standard procedure since 
demining activities in this mine field resumed on 2 July 2006. The accident occurred at 
about 6:16 am. 
11. Activities on each [International demining group] task site are recorded within the pages 
of an [International demining group] Team Leader’s Logbook. Example pages from the 
logbook used at this task site are shown at Annex C. 
12. National Mine Action Standards require that a copy of Standing Operational Procedures 
is held on each task site. One copy was available for reference at this task site. 
 
GEOGRAPHY 
13. The accident occurred near the village of Shull, in Rasht district. Lat/Lon 070° 19′ 33″ N, 
39° 01′ 12.2″ E. Elevation is approximately 1950 metres above sea level. Map sheet 10 
42 033. See map at Annex D. 
14. The general area where the accident occurred is grassy pastureland, in a mountainous 
region above the western side of the village of Shull. The point of detonation occurred 
within a rocky outcrop inside the working area of a deminer involved in the clearance of 
ground as part of his normal duties at that location. 
15. The minefield is situated on the top of a very steep-sided hill and the clearance lane 
where the accident occurred is on mixed stony and grassy ground within a rocky outcrop 
on the north western side of Shull Mountain. 
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16. The full extent of the mined area in this location is uncertain. Local information and 
information from MoD indicates at least 300,000 square metres are contaminated with 
800 PMN mines on the area, as well as an unknown number of OZM-72 bounding 
fragmentation mines. The mines were originally laid to protect at least four anti-aircraft 
gun positions and perhaps a further four mortar positions, sited on Shull Mountain as part 
of local protection for Garm airport. There are no known minefield records for this area. 
Since 25 May 2004 approximately 50,000 square metres of ground have been cleared. 
Eleven OZM-72 and seven items of unexploded ordnance have been found and 
destroyed. No PMN mines had been found on the area prior to this accident. 
[The picture below shows the rocky outcrop where the accident occurred.] 
 
17. There is no road onto the area and to reach the minefield a very substantial walk of two 
kilometres, with a vertical height gain of over six hundred metres, is required.  
18. The nearest inhabited buildings are at the village of Shull, approximately two kilometres 
away to the west from the accident site. The town of Garm is approximately ten 
kilometres away.  
19. Weather conditions at the site on the day of the accident and during the inquiry were dry, 
warm and sunny and there had been no rain or cold weather during the preceding week. 
The ground was dry at the time of the accident. 
20. The [International demining group] demining team at Shull are living in a tented camp 
approximately four hundred and fifty metres from the minefield and are supported by 
[International demining group] with sufficient primary health care, shelter and food. Water 
is collected on a daily basis by using a donkey to carry water in containers from a nearby 
mountain stream. 
21. Further images of the site and the general area are shown at Annex E. 
 
PRIORITY OF TASK  
22. This task was designated as high priority by TMAC, after meetings with and 
representations from the local government in the area. During [International demining 
group]’s initial survey of the area, in 2003, local inhabitants verbally reported up to sixteen 
human accidents on the area. Some of these accidents have been formally reported and 
are recorded in the national IMSMA database. Others are anecdotal and little formal 
information is known about them. 
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING 
23. Marking of the area between cleared and uncleared areas is in accordance with 
[International demining group]’s Standing Operational Procedures. Marking in clearance 
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lanes and elsewhere on the site was adequate, but could be improved. A plan of the site 
is attached at Annex F showing the areas of clearance. 
24. Suggested improvements: 
e) Sign boards should be erected to show locations of medical area, detector 
test area etc. 
f) Mark ‘Hotline’ (a rolling start-line that can be advanced as land is cleared and 
QA on it is completed) beyond which PPE must be worn. 
g) Mark a formal Control Point, where deminers and visitors are briefed, maps 
are maintained and where personnel may gather in an emergency, if so 
instructed. 
25. When the mines were laid in 1995, no marking was emplaced by the troops who put 
down the mines. The only marking currently on the site was placed there by [International 
demining group]’s demining teams and this consists of wooden pickets, plastic marking 
tape and mine warning triangles, in accordance with their own Standing Operational 
Procedures and UN International Mine Action Standards. The route from the ambulance 
parking place at the bottom of the hill to the task site area at the top of the hill is marked 
with red-painted rocks to indicate the line of the pathway. 
26. The accident occurred within a marked clearance lane which was being cleared at the 
time of the accident. The next nearest clearance lane to where the accident occurred is 
25 metres away from the point of detonation and the nearest working deminer at the time 
of the explosion was working in that lane. 
 
SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE 
27. The mine action team working on this task live in a tented encampment on the task site 
area, approximately four hundred and fifty metres to the south of the main works area. 
[International demining group] have a total of twenty-seven personnel working on this 
project task site and these are managed and monitored by supervisor [Name removed], 
who arrived on site on 11 August 2006 to replace outgoing supervisor [Name removed 
who was leaving to take up a task at another mine clearance site. Before departure [The 
outgoing supervisor] stayed for one day together with [the new supervisor] to ensure that 
he was familiar with the task site and the works there. 
28. A demining team logbook was available to record visitors and routine daily events at the 
site. See Annex C. As well as the supervisor, the mine action unit on Shull Mountain 
consists of one Team Leader, eighteen deminers and support personnel as shown in the 
diagram below. [Diagram omitted.] 
29. Routine management visits by [International demining group] quality assurance and 
technical supervisors are not made as regularly as they should be because expatriate 
personnel who should be deployed to Tajikistan are not deployed. 
30. Every other night deminers have night-time sentry duty to guard the demining camp site 
and work area. [The Victim] was on duty between 0200hrs to 0400hrs on the morning of 




31. On-site management, supervision and Quality Assurance (QA) of works at the task site 
are the responsibility of the supervisor. In the August Logbook there is no page for Quality 
Control. 
32. In support of the on-site supervisor there is normally a formal regime of internal 
supervision and inspection for the work of all of [International demining group]’s Mine 
Action Teams. Their work is also regulated by UN International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS), Tajikistan National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) and the organisation’s own 
Standing Operational Procedures (SOP). 
33. [International demining group] report that their managers should routinely visit their teams 
and work sites on an occasional basis, approximately once each week. This should 
include visits either by the expatriate Project Manager, the expatriate Operations Officer 
or their local national counterparts. However, the only recorded visit from any senior 
manager or expatriate adviser to this task site was on 13 July 2006 when [Name 
removed], [International demining group] [national] Operations Officer made a visit to 
destroy an anti personnel mine which had been found on the site. This visit is shown in 
the site log book. 
34. As well as [International demining group]’s internal Quality Control, TMAC normally 
inspects all task sites through the national Quality Assurance Officer. The most recent 
inspection by the TMAC QA Officer was on 19 July 2006. See TMAC QA Report at Annex 
G. 
35. As part of internal Quality Control (QC) procedures, the Supervisor, Team Leader or 
Section Leader at the task site is required to check each area cleared to ensure that no 
signals are received from a metal detector when it is passed over areas which have been 
cleared by a deminer. In this instance Section Leader [Name removed] checked a 
completed five-metre long lane which had been cleared by [the Victim] immediately prior 
to the first morning rest break on the day of the accident and this was confirmed by Team 
Leader [Name removed]. To mark the limit of his QC inspection, [Name removed] marked 
the end of the checked lane with a green marker picket as required by [International 
demining group] normal working practices. The picket was still in place during the Board 
of Inquiry inspection of the site after the accident. [The Victim] then took his ten-minute 
rest break as planned and then came back to his place of work to start a new clearance 
lane adjacent to the one he had just completed. 
 
COMMUNICATIONS 
36. [International demining group]’s communications network on Shull Mountain is based on 
handheld VHF radios for internal contact within the task site area and mobile telephones 
for external contact.  
37. Routine twice-daily reports are made to [International demining group]’s Dushanbe HQ 
office from the Shull task site by mobile telephone. 
38. On the day of the accident, three mobile telephones were on site, but team leader [Name 
removed] called by radio to one of the vehicles at the bottom of the hill and sent the driver 
in it to inform the hospital at Garm that a casualty would soon be on the way to them. 
[The Team Leader] informed the Board of Inquiry that, at the time of the accident, this 
seemed the best way to inform the hospital about what was happening, but agrees that 




39. One person was directly involved and injured in the accident; [the Victim], a local national 
Ministry of Defence deminer employed by [International demining group] who was 
deployed to the site as part of his routine duties managed by [International demining 
group] Dushanbe. 
40. [The Victim] received serious blast and secondary fragmentation injuries to his face. A 
little over one hour after the accident occurred he was treated at Garm hospital where he 
received emergency surgery to stem the bleeding from his face before being evacuated 
by helicopter to the Russian Military Hospital in Dushanbe on the same day. A report from 
the Russian Military Hospital states that the casualty received the following injuries: 
h) Mine explosion trauma. Concussion of the brain. 
i) Multiple fragmentation and penetration injuries to the face, with both eyeballs 
eviscerated. 
j) Open fragmentation fracture of the left tibia with likelihood of full recovery. 
(Originally written as ‘Open fragmentation fracture of the left shinbone with 
satisfactory of standing fracture’). 
k) Open fracture of middle base of phalanx on the second finger of the right 
hand. 
l) Fragmentation injuries to left knee and right thigh.  
m) Level 1 Shock. 
41. Deminer [Deminer 1] was working close to the victim and, after the mine detonated, 
arrived at the scene of the accident first. Team Leader [Name removed] arrived 
immediately after. The team leader instructed another deminer who had been working 
nearby, [Deminer 2], to clear a path to the casualty and the area surrounding him. The 
casualty was then carried by fellow deminers to a designated intermediate medical 
treatment point on a cleared area of ground approximately one-hundred and twenty-five 
metres from the point of detonation where the medic from Section Number Two, [Name 
removed], was stationed. During the next few minutes, during which time the second 
medic arrived and preparations were made to treat and stabilize the casualty, the two 
medics treated his injuries. Medics continued to give medical attention as he was carried, 
on a stretcher, away from the minefield and down the mountain, towards the ambulance 
park two kilometres downhill. 
42. All [International demining group] operations normally deploy with a qualified medic as 
part of the team; a comprehensive trauma and first aid pack and a fully equipped 
ambulance vehicle appropriate to demining operations is provided at every task site. All 
demining personnel receive twenty-four hours of first aid instruction as part of basic 
deminer training and a further 16 hours as part of annual refresher training. Medical and 
emergency support provided to the team involved in this accident was adequate for the 
circumstances. Because there is no road to the task site area, ambulances to support the 
team are stationed at the bottom of the mountain approximately two kilometres from the 
task site. 
43. National standards require that a casualty evacuation exercise should be carried out 
immediately on first arrival at any task site and routinely at least once each month. This 
task started on 02 July. The on-site log book records that exercises were carried out on 
10 and 22 July and on 10 and 18 August. The hand-written heading on the page of the 
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August logbook where this has been recorded has been altered from July to read August 
2006 and the column headed ‘Date’ has been altered from 10.07, to read 10.08. The 
same entry was made by the same hand in the July logbook for 10 July. Although the 
Board of Inquiry consider these alterations to be worthy of note, it is accepted that that 
this could possibly be a simple administrative error. 
44. At 0715 hours the casualty was removed from the area in the team’s ambulance vehicle, 
driven by [Name removed], and taken to the city hospital in Garm, approximately ten 
kilometres from the site. Immediately on arrival at the hospital, [the Victim] was admitted 
to the emergency department and transferred into the operating theatre. 
45. Further evacuation from Garm hospital was available by military VIP helicopter if required 
and helicopter availability and operations provided by the Ministry of Defence were 
adequate throughout the course of the medical evacuation to Dushanbe. 
46. Up to 31 August 2006, injured deminer [the Victim] was unable to recall any of the events 
leading up to the accident which is the subject of this report. He is making progress in 
hospital but will remain unaware of the full extent of his injuries until doctors decide he is 
ready to be told. Although his face is very seriously injured, he still has his facial features 
and his nose and ears are intact. His lips are very badly damaged and he has lost some 
teeth. One eye is missing and the other eye is very seriously damaged. A full evaluation 
of his condition has not been made yet. 
 
PERSONALITIES INVOLVED 
47. Personnel directly involved in the accident were members of Mine Action Team No 1, 
from [International demining group] Dushanbe. [Table of names removed.] 
48. All team members are trained and qualified deminers. All personnel have completed and 
passed at least one [International demining group] basic deminer training course. Most 
members of the team have limited experienced in mine action activities and have 
received instruction in first aid as part of their basic training. Deminers’ job descriptions 
state that part of their duties is to assist with the treatment and evacuation of casualties in 
the event of a mine accident. Deminers’ Job Description is shown at Annex H. 
49. The team had been working at the area since 2 July 2006 and their last days of rest were 
on 30 July to 04 August. This was their second operational deployment since their basic 
training, which they completed just prior to their initial deployment on 2 July 2006. 
 
EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS 
50. The deminer involved in this accident was deployed with a standard-issue [International 
demining group] deminer’s toolkit. The items mentioned below were found at the scene of 
the accident. Evidence at the site and interviews with team members indicate that tools 
were being used correctly. 
51. Metal detector – Ebinger model 420H. The detector batteries were found to be flat when 
the board of inquiry team inspected the site on 23 August, because it had remained 
switched on for more than two days after the accident. On-site testing showed that the 
Ebinger detector is capable of locating PMN anti-personnel mines to the required depth in 
the type of soil encountered at this task site. When the detector was recovered from the 
scene of the accident a new battery was installed and, when tested, the detector 
appeared to be 100% effective.  
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52. Prodder - A stainless steel prodder was found next to the crater and it was clear that, 
although ready for deployment, this tool was not in immediate use at the time when the 
mine detonated. 
53. Pin hammer, normally used for driving wooden marker pickets into the ground. This was 
laid neatly on the ground, next to the manual prodder tool. 
54. Trowel – A stainless steel, blast-resistant trowel, manufactured by LVP Technology of 
South Africa, (http://www.lvptech.com/Main.htm) was in the crater left by the blast of the 
mine. The trowel was severely damaged, the final 2cm of the point of the blade is rolled 
back on itself and the handle is bent completely over the blade. 
[The trowel before and after the accident is shown below. This is sold as blast resistant 
because the material does not break. However, the length is not as recommended in IMAS, 




55. Base-stick and clearance lane marking tape – The base stick and clearance lane marking 
tape normally used by deminers in clearance lanes was laid askew, lying diagonally 
across the clearance lane. It looked as though it was probably disturbed during the 
detonation or at some time soon afterwards. The Board of Inquiry team agreed that, 
taking into account the general disposition of this equipment, it seemed most likely that 
[the Victim] had been using the base stick in an approved manner prior to the accident. 
56. All personal protective equipment (PPE) at the site conformed to Paragraph 4 of UN 
International Mine Action Standard 10.30, in that it was capable of protecting against the 
effects of an explosive blast as follows: 
n) Frontal protection. Appropriate to the activity, capable of protecting against 
the blast effects of 240g of TNT at 30cm from the closest part of the body. 
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PPE equipment used by [International demining group] in Tajikistan is 
provided by ROFI, of Norway. http://www.rofi.com/  
o) Eye protection. Capable of retaining integrity against the blast effects of 240g 
of TNT at 60cm, providing full frontal coverage of face and throat as part of 
the specified frontal protection ensemble. Facial visors used by [International 
demining group] in Tajikistan are manufactured by Security Devices of 
Zimbabwe. http://www.secdevinc.com/  
 
DETAILS OF MINE INVOLVED 
57. Bakelite, metal and rubber fragments recovered from the crater created by the blast of the 
explosion show that the mine involved was a Russian PMN anti-personnel blast mine. 
The crater left by the detonation is as would be expected from such a device. See Annex 
I. 
58. A PMN anti-personnel mine is loaded with 240 grams of high explosive and a 9 gram 
booster charge. It is designed to be operated by 8 to 25Kg of pressure from above. 
[Pictures of PMN removed.] 
59. Analysis of the crater caused by the detonation shows that the mine involved in this 
accident was buried at a depth of approximately 2 to 14 centimetres in the ground. The 
mine was inside the marked clearance lane where deminer [the Victim] was working at 
the time of the accident. See Annex J. 
60. From a military point of view, the place where the mine was laid could be considered a 
good location on which to site a defensive position or observation post. As such, any 
operation to deny the land to enemy forces might be expected to emplace landmines 
there. 
 
DRESS & PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
61. All members of the team involved were issued with their own set of personal protective 
equipment consisting of a blast-resistant apron and a blast-resistant visor. When [the 
Victim] was evacuated from the clearance lane he was still wearing his blast-resistant 
apron. His visor sustained some slight damage, probably as it was blown from his face; it 
was recovered from a point approximately three metres outside the cleared lane during 
the Board of Inquiry inspection of the accident site. It was also approximately three 
metres from where [the Victim] landed after the mine detonated. Images of [the Victim]’s 
Personal Protective Equipment are shown at Annex K. 
62. Each member of the team was also wearing a pair of 100% cotton trousers and a 100% 
cotton jacket, issued by [International demining group]. Leather working gloves are also 
issued but [the Victim] was not wearing these at the time of the accident.  
63. Polycarbonate face visor. Eye protection is essential in manual demining and each 
deminer is issued with a personal face shield manufactured from 5mm Polycarbonate and 
equipped with a head-frame made from ballistic Aramid covered with waterproof nylon. 
Injuries sustained by [the Victim] indicate very clearly that either he was not wearing his 
visor at the time the mine detonated in front of him or he was wearing the visor 
incorrectly. It is possible that he lifted the visor, partially or fully, away from his face in 
order to get a clearer view of the ground or of something else. If the visor is lifted away 
from the operator’s face even slightly, away from the collar of the blast resistant apron 
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wherein it normally rests, it can provide a gap in the deminer’s frontal protection through 
which the effects of an explosive blast may enter. See following image. 
64. Deminers’ protective visors are manufactured by heat-forming 5mm untreated 
polycarbonate in special ovens. Polycarbonate scratches and marks easily if not looked 
after very carefully and can become difficult to see through clearly. Although minor 
scratches and marks do not significantly degrade the visor’s performance against the 
effects of explosive blast, Polycarbonate degrades in sunlight and the UN Mine Action 
Service recommends that visors should usually be replaced each year.  
65. The blast resistant visor is the crux of this investigation. During the Board of Inquiry’s time 
at the demining task site and the scene of the accident, a number of visors were 
observed by each member of the team. Some were in good condition, others were less 
so. If a visor is clear and clean and unmarked it is obviously easier to see through and 
there will obviously be less temptation for a deminer to lift his visor to attain a better view 
of his work or surroundings. 
66. Protective facial visors are notoriously difficult to wear and deminers universally do not 
like to wear them. This is particularly the case in hot weather, when they can become 
fogged with condensation from the wearer’s breath. When reasons for raising visors are 
given by deminers, they commonly make reference to a lack of optical clarity when 
looking through the visor. This may be blamed on light scratching, breath condensation, 
distracting optics (caused by reflections and refracted sunlight), airlessness and 
excessive heat. [The Victim’s visor is shown below.] 
 
67. There is sufficient damage inside the visor to suggest that it deflected environmental and 
mine-case fragmentation onto [the Victim’s]’s face from the detonation of the PMN anti-
personnel mine he was likely excavating at the time of the accident. From this it seems 
very likely that [the Victim] was using his trowel and excavating vertically over the mine 
with his visor at least partly raised.  
[Damage to the Victim’s body armour makes it likely that a closed visor would have also 
sustained significant damage low down.] 
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68. Interrogation of the online International Database of Demining Incidents and Victims, 
(www.ddasonline.com) shows that the eye protection issued to accident victim(s) was 
either not worn or worn in the raised position in more than 40% of all recorded accidents 
that have occurred during excavation of the ground (either area-excavation or the 
excavation involved with investigating a metal-detector signal). The result is 
often blindness in one or both eyes. The unusual severity of the head injury that incurred 
in this accident implies that the victim's head may have been closer to the device than 
usual. If the victim was crouching low over the device when he initiated it this may explain 
the unusually severe injury.  
 
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES ON DAY OF ACCIDENT 
69. The team’s work at this task site started on 2 July after a tasking from TMAC to 
[International demining group] and a subsequent deployment from Dushanbe. The team 
arrived in the area during the afternoon of that day and set up their camp with 
accommodation tents and a field kitchen. 
70. The day before the accident was a Sunday, a day of rest for the team, and most 
personnel, including [the Victim], went to the nearby town of Garm where they used the 
public bath house and ate lunch in various local restaurants. 
71. Activities on the night before the accident followed a normal routine pattern and after 
eating dinner at about seven o’clock, team members, including [the Victim], watched 
television and then went to their beds between nine o’clock and ten-thirty, the same time 
as usual.  
72. No evidence was found that any person at this task site was suffering from illness or 
sickness or had any reason to behave in any way that would be considered as out of the 
ordinary. No alcohol or drugs are permitted on the task site area and deminers are 
forbidden to consume alcohol during their tours of duty on operational tasks. 
73. On the day of the accident, team members awoke and arose, as usual, at between four 
and four-thirty in the morning. No breakfast was taken by the team and, after a visit to the 
bathroom and latrine, a routine morning safety briefing was delivered by the Team Leader 
and all team members were at work in the minefield by 0500hrs. 
74. Breakfast at this site depends on the availability of water. The site cook reports that, if 
water is available, team members have bread and tea with sugar and butter before 
starting work at 0500hrs. If water is not available first thing in the morning, then the team 
will instead receive breakfast after the cook has collected water from the local stream. On 
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such days this usually means that breakfast is taken at between six and seven o’clock in 
the morning. 
75. The minefield clearance of the task site is in several separate areas. [The Victim] went to 
the Northern end of the minefield, started work and continued his duties of searching for 
landmines, working along the clearance lane towards a north westerly direction and using 
approved procedures, in accordance with normal working practices and [International 
demining group]’s published Standing Operational Procedures. 
76. On returning to the clearance lane after the rest break, [the Victim] started to work by 
clearing a new one-metre wide lane next to the lane he had recently completed. He used 
a base stick, in accordance with [International demining group] SOP, to mark the limit of 
his exploration into the uncleared area and standard-issue tools to carry out the work of 
search and clearance within the lane. 
77. A short distance along this new clearance lane [the Victim] was confronted by a rocky 
outcrop which he knew that he was required to clear in the same way as he would have 
cleared any other piece of ground.  
78. [The Victim] is unable to recall what happened to him beyond this point. Informed 
conjecture based upon observations at the site and interviews with team members 
suggests that this is what happened: 
p) [The Victim] was progressing from the south to the north along his clearance 
lane when he heard a signal from his metal detector to indicate that there 
was a piece of metal in the ground within the designated search area in front 
of him. 
q) He began to investigate the signal, but it was within a hole amongst the rocks 
in front of him, in a place where he would have had to reach down at least 
half-a-metre in order to excavate the cause of the signal. 
r) To avoid the problem of reaching down, he walked forward, within his search 
lane and over solid rock, to approach the area of the signal from the Northern 
end of his search lane. 
s) Continuing his SOP drills he began to excavate the area of the source of the 
signal to the metal detector using the trowel issued to him for this purpose. 
He may not have been working to the SOP drill, as it seems likely that, 
because of the restricted area of work caused by the surrounding rocks, he 
was digging directly down to the mine, rather than digging across to the mine 
by excavating a small trench. 
t) An explosion occurred when the PMN antipersonnel mine, which was the 
source of the metal detector signal, detonated.  
79. At the time of detonation the area of ground wherein the mine was buried was in shadow, 
whilst at the same time the sun was rising over the horizon into [the Victim]’s face. This 
combination of light and shadow would probably have made observation more difficult 
than normal. 
80. Marks made by the effects of explosive blast and shattered stones onto the rock around 
the crater suggest that the mine may have been laid at an angle, with the pressure plate 
aiming directly towards the direction from where [the Victim] was approaching. 
81. A cut turf next to the crater and the position of the casualty after the detonation indicate 
that [the Victim] was approaching the mine from the western direction, facing east. 
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TIMELINE 21 AUG 2006 - THE DAY OF ACCIDENT 
0400 or 0430:  Morning wake-up call at Shull demining task site. 
0430-0440:  Morning routine. 
0440-0450:  Daily safety briefing from Supervisor [Name removed] 
0500:  Team starts work in Shull minefield. 
0540:  Section Leader – [Name removed] checks [the Victim]’s work before rest break. 
0550-0600:  First rest break of daily routine. 
0616:  Explosion. 
06??:  Team Leader [Name removed] phones [International demining group] HQ office in 
Dushanbe to inform about accident. 
0620:  Casualty recovered from point of explosion and carried on a stretcher to the medical 
point. 
0622:   Medics attend to casualty. 
0630:  Group begins descending the mountain, carrying casualty on a stretcher to the vehicle 
point. 
0700:  TMAC Quality Assurance Officer – [Name removed] receives first call from TMAC 
Manager - [Name removed] about the accident.  
0715:  [International demining group] Vehicle leaves site for the nearest hospital, located in 
the city of Garm. 
0721:  Casualty arrives at hospital, is admitted to emergency and transferred into operating 
theatre. 
0735:  TMAC Quality Assurance Officer arrives at MoD Centre for Helicopters in Aini. 
0850:  Helicopter leaves for Garm with TMAC QA Officer, [Name removed] (MoD), [Name 
removed] ([International demining group]), [Name removed] ([International demining group] 
operations Officer), [Name removed] ([International demining group] Translator), [Name 
removed] ([International demining group] team leader). 
0940:  Helicopter arrives at Garm airport. 
1340:  Casualty and two accompanying doctors leave hospital for airport with [QA Officer] 
(TMAC), [Name removed] (MoD), [Name removed] ([International demining group]). 
1406: Helicopter leaves Garm. 
1456:  Helicopter arrives in Dushanbe and casualty is transferred to Russian Military Hospital. 
1520:  Casualty arrives at Russian Military Hospital and is taken to the operating theatre. 
82. Selected statements from team members are shown at Annex L. 
 
ORGANISATION OF IMMEDIATE REACTION 
83. Medic [Name removed] states that during the immediate moments after the accident he 
contacted the nearby demining task site at Chorcharog to inform them about what had 
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happened. This caused medics and members of the team at Chorchaog to drive to the 
ambulance point at Shull. 
84. Medic [Name removed] also states that he instructed, by VHF radio, the driver of the 
[International demining group] truck at Shull to go to the hospital at Garm to inform them 
what had happened. Team Leader [Name removed] states that he too made this 
instruction by VHF radio. 
85. At 7:20 [Name removed], chief of engineering services at MoD, received a phone call 
from TMAC National Director [Name removed] regarding the accident. At 7:25 at the 
Ministry of Defence the General began working on deploying a helicopter to retrieve the 
victim. The Air Force commander ordered a helicopter to depart at 7:50 am. When [Name 
removed] arrived in Garm 45 minutes later, [the Victim] was in the hospital. 
86. Helicopter evacuation from Garm to Dushanbe was carried out in a satisfactory manner 
and the helicopter was made available promptly and efficiently. 
87. [International demining group] initially reported that, probably due to the early hour of the 
day, on first arrival at the hospital in Garm appropriate doctors were not available to 
provide treatment to the injured deminer. It is most likely that this situation could have 
been improved if communications from the scene of the accident to the hospital had been 
established over a mobile telephone and perhaps a running commentary of the situation 
might then have been relayed to the hospital while doctors were being contacted.  
 
SUMMARY 
88. Injuries sustained by [the Victim] indicate very clearly that either he was not wearing his 
visor at the time the mine detonated in front of him, or the visor he was wearing was lifted 
away from his face and out of the collar of his protective apron. 
89. Management and supervision at the task site could be improved. This applies from [the 
Victim] not requesting supervisory advice from his immediate supervisor, to the frequency 
of managerial and Quality Assurance visits to the task site. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
90. It would be easy to conclude that this accident was the result of simple human error. 
However, at closer inspection it is apparent that this task site could be improved with 
more supervision from senior management and more attention to detail in reporting and 
during practices of casualty evacuation procedures. 
91. The accident also underscores the need to ensure that deminers observe and maintain 
the standards they are taught during basic training. On realising that the initial signal on 
his metal detector emanated from a place on the ground which was difficult to access, 
[the Victim] should have called for assistance. It is likely that he would then have been 
advised to work around the rock systematically, or to start a new clearance lane to 
approach the signal from a new direction. More importantly, any such call for assistance 
should have led to a pause in [the Victim]’s work and provided an opportunity to think 




92. All members of the team involved in this accident should undergo at least three eight-hour 
days of refresher training and psychological counselling before being re-deployed to any 
demining task.  
93. Adherence to Standing Operational Procedures. It is possible that the following routine 
SOP measures could have reduced the risk to deminer [the Victim]: 
u) All personnel at all work sites should conform to all aspects of [International 
demining group]’s Standing Operational Procedures. Specifically, this should 
mean that, when they are working within hazardous areas, personnel 
deployed on mine clearance operations should wear PPE complete with visor 
in the fully down position to completely cover the wearer’s face. 
v) If a deminer comes across a situation where normal SOPs do not apply, he 
should call the Section Leader, Team Leader or Supervisor. This gives pause 
to the operation, brings in a more senior person to assist the deminer and 
allows time for thought about what to do next. In the specific context of this 
demining accident, it is likely that the Section Leader, Team Leader or 
Supervisor would have advised that a fresh start should have been made to 
clear the lane from the North or North West direction. 
94. [International demining group] should institute a system of husbandry, maintenance and 
quality control on all visors at every task site. This should include at least the following. 
w) Daily cleaning sessions. 
x) Daily inspections by Section Leader, Team Leader or Supervisor. 
y) Inspections of visors during senior staff visits to task sites. 
z) Registration of serial numbers of each visor issued to each deminer. 
aa) Annual renewal of every visor. 
95. TMAC should deploy the national Quality Assurance Inspector to: 
bb) Check a percentage of deminers’ visors at each task site as part of routine 
QA inspections. 
cc) Monitor Casevac practices; this should be implemented in agreement with 
[International demining group]. 
dd) Check the on-site logbook thoroughly and ensure that all parts of the log are 
being used appropriately and accurately. This includes Attendance Sheets, 
Quality Control Logbook, Casevac Exercise Log, and all other pages in the 
logbook. 
ee) Report on frequency of management visits to the site.  
96. [The Victim] was on night-time sentry duty from 2 a.m. to 4 a.m. on the morning of the 
accident and may have been tired and hungry on that morning. [International demining 
group] should institute a formal regime of eating before work starts at the beginning of 
each day. Deminers should eat breakfast before starting work – there are recorded 
instances from other countries where deminers have been involved in demining accidents 
which were probably caused partly because their minds and bodies were not functioning 
properly first thing in the morning after working without sustenance since the night before.  
97. [International demining group] should write an SOP to establish drills and procedures to 
be used by deminers when searching and clearing rocky outcrops. 
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98. [International demining group] should increase the frequency of management, 
supervisory, technical and Quality Assurance visits to task sites. 
99. The local hospital should always be contacted by telephone during any incident which will 
involve a casualty being taken to the hospital. 
100. As recommended in the Board of Inquiry report for the accident which occurred on 19 
April 2006, a casualty evacuation exercise should be carried out from every task site 
during the first twelve hours at any newly appointed task site. This should be followed by 
a casualty evacuation exercise at least once each month. Such exercises should be 
recorded in the site log book together with the names of all personnel who carried out the 
exercise. In order to confirm communications, all casevac exercises should always 
include a telephone call from the task site to the local hospital. All personnel at the task 
site should be involved in the exercise and all appropriate personnel (at least medics and 
ambulance drivers) should travel from the task site all the way to the door of the hospital 
emergency department. 
101. [International demining group] should ensure that all parts of on-site logbooks are 
properly completed on a daily basis. 
102. As recommended in the Board of Inquiry report for the accident which occurred on 19 
April 2006, the Board of Inquiry recommends again that, in order to better reflect good 
practices and recent developments in mine action, [International demining group] SOP 
should be reviewed and updated urgently. 
 
Signed: UNDP Chief Technical Adviser; Chief of Engineering, Ministry of Defence; Quality 
Assurance Officer, TMAC 
 
Annexes 
Initial report of mine accident 
Terms of Reference for Board of Inquiry 
Example pages from Team’s on-site logbook  
1:50,000 Map 
Images of site and general area 
Sketch plan of the site 
TMAC QA Report 
Deminers’ Job description 





DISTRIBUTION: TMAC National Programme Director,; [International demining group] 
Dushanbe; UNDP CO Dushanbe; DDIV/DDAS 
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 645 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 19 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: no 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: One hour, five minutes
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, visor 
worn raised 
 






AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eyes  
COMMENT: See Medical report. 
 
Medical report 
21 August, 2006 
Extracts from the medical report of the patient stationed at the dispensary 
 
DoB: 1987 
Dates of : arrival to the hospital  21 August, 200; left  the hospital: 21 August, 2006 
Diagnosis: Closed cranial-cerebral injury. Concussion to the brain. Open fragmentation 
fracture of the left cheekbone without dislocation. Both eyes: avulsion of eye-bulbs with 
prolepses and drainage of vitreous substance. Open fragmentation fracture of the left 
cheekbone. 
Brief anamnesis, diagnostic examination, process of the disease, conducted treatment and 
status during the arrival and in the discharging period.   
The patient [Name removed] (born in 1987) arrived in Central District Hospital (CDH) in Rasht 
in a very difficult condition. According to confirmations by his accompanying personnel, he 
was injured during mine clearance in a minefield on 21 August 2006 at approx. at 06:16. He 
was evacuated to the surgery department of the CDH by an ambulance. The general 
condition of the patient during his arrival in the hospital was very serious and he could not 
answer to questions.  He was in a half-conscious like condition. Arterial pressure was 70/40. 
The pulse was 120 times per minute. During examination of the face a large crushed 
lacerated wound, necrotic webs, a torn rag of the left side of the cheek area and the area 
closed to ears were observed. Open fragmentation fracture of the left cheekbone without 
dislocation was also observed. After appropriate preparation, an initial operation of the injuries 
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of the face was done under the endo- tracheal narcosis. The torn rag of the left side of the 
cheek was sewn layer by layer. Drainage-tubes and aseptic bandage were installed. 
21 August, 2006 
Signed: Attending physician 
The pictures below show the Victim before and after surgery. 
 
Photographs showed one leg bandaged top to bottom, the other peppered with small 
fragmentation wounds at the thigh. Both hands were bandaged and bloody with lacerations of 
the fingers. 
31st August 2006 below 
 
Email 21st August 2006 from Demining group National manager: 
“Today the operator had another surgery in Russian military hospital for 1hr 30min on  his 
eyes. No frags in his skull. I've talked with the doctor who made surgery, she said that [the 
Victim] lost sight in both eyes.” 
 
STATEMENTS 
Statement no.1: Team Leader, MAT 1 
On 21 August 2006 I, [Name removed], woke up at 04:30 and lined the team members up 
and briefed them about safety instructions and compliance with them and sent all the 
deminers and section leaders to the site. All the deminers began to work at 5 o’clock sharp. At 
5:50 I whistled for “10 minutes’ break”. After break everybody was back to his clearance lane. 
I went to the deminer [Name removed]’s lane and was giving him some advice when at this 
moment, at approx. at 6:16 there was an explosion at the deminer [the Victim]’s site. The 
Team Leader [Name removed] immediately shouted in the radio: Mine Accident! Mine 
Accident! I ordered the deminers [Name removed] and [Name removed] to bring the stretcher 
and I hurried to the site of the accident. When I reached the location, the deminers who 
worked closer to [the Victim] as well as the Team Leader [Name removed], were already 
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there. The deminer [Name removed] checked around the mine victim with a mine detector 
and the victim was evacuated on the stretcher from the mine field up to the medic. The 
medics offered first aid to him. At approx. at 6.30 hrs I informed [Name removed] – 
[International demining group] National Manager – by my mobile phone. Then, I sent 
[International demining group] driver [Name removed] to the Central District Hospital in Rasht 
to inform the doctors to be ready. At this moment we carried the mine victim down from the 
mountain and took him to the hospital by [International demining group] ambulance. The 
doctors examined the victim and asked me to call the [International demining group] HQ in 
Dushanbe to send a helicopter to evacuate the victim to Dushanbe Hospital. I called [Name 
removed] by my mobile phone. The helicopter arrived at 09:45 hrs. At approx. 10 o’clock the 
following personnel arrived at Garm Hospital: [Name removed], [Name removed], [Name 
removed], [Name removed] and [Name removed]. At about 13:50 hrs the doctors finished 
operating on the mine victim and then the victim was taken to the airport and was evacuated 
by helicopter to Dushanbe together with one of the [International demining group] medics 
doctor [Name removed], [Name removed] and [Name removed]. I wrote the statement myself 
and have nothing to add. 
Signed: 22 August, 2006  
 
Statement no.2:  deminer: MAT 1 
On 21 August, 2006 I, [Name removed], woke up at 04:30. I put on my PPE. After listening to 
the safety briefing from my supervisor I signed the Safety Briefings Logbook and walked to 
the minefield. At my lane, I fixed the tapes which were opened due to the wind. I began mine 
clearance for 50 minutes. Later the Team Leader came and tested my cleared lane with a 
mine detector. Then we had a break for 10 minutes and returned to begin mine clearance 
again. After some minutes there was an explosion. The Team Leader shouted: Mine 
Accident! I closed my lane and ran towards the mine victim. I wrote the statement myself and 
have nothing to add.  
Signed:  21 August, 2006 
 
Statement no.3:  Medic: MAT 1 
On 21 August 2006 I, [Name removed] – [International demining group] Medic, MAT 1, woke 
up at 04:30 together with other team members. At 04:50 I went to the medical point. At 05:50 
the deminers stopped the work for a break and in 10 minutes they were back to their sites and 
began working. At approx. 06:16 a mine accident occurred and the team leader [Name 
removed] informed me by radio that a mine accident occurred and [the Victim] is injured. 
Medic [Name removed], who was farther away in his station called me by radio. I asked him if 
he could come to the medic’s point. He came. The victim was brought to us within 5 minutes 
after the accident. We - both medics offered the first aid to the victim. In 7-8 minutes we 
began to evacuate the victim and at about 07:20 we took the victim to the Central District 
Hospital in Garm. The doctors at the hospital offered their assistance. Later we were told by 
Dushanbe office that a helicopter is coming for assistance. At about 15:00-15:10 we put the 
victim on board of the helicopter. Medic [Name removed] joined the victim in the helicopter 
and went to Dushanbe and I remained with the team. I wrote the statement myself and have 
nothing to add.  
Signed: 22 August, 2006 
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Statement no.4:  Cook and deminer: MAT 1 
On 21 August 2006 I, [Name removed], woke up at 04:30. After tidying the yard, I was making 
breakfast for the deminers when I suddenly heard the explosion. I wrote the statement myself 
and have nothing to add.  
Signed: 21 August, 2006 
 
Statement no.5:  Section One Leader  
On 21 August 2006 I, [Name removed], woke up at 04:30. I put on my PPE and lined the 
team members up and briefed them about safety instructions together with [Name removed]. I 
and all the deminers signed in the Safety Briefings Logbook and went to the minefield. All the 
deminers began to work at 5 o’clock sharp. At 5:50 the Team Leader whistled for “10 minutes’ 
break”. After 10 min. the Team Leader called everybody back to work. I began to inspect all 
the deminer’s performance. I was inspecting deminer [Name removed]’s work when suddenly, 
at approx. at 6:16 hrs, there was an explosion. The Team Leader [Name removed] 
immediately shouted: Mine Accident! I saw dust at the deminer [the Victim]’s site. I hurried 
towards the site of the mine accident. The Team Leader [Name removed] and [Name 
removed] were already there. The victim was evacuated on the stretcher from the mine field 
up to the medics. The medics offered their first aid to him. Together with the Team Leader 
[Name removed], both medics and 12 deminers carried the victim down to the ambulance. 
Then the Team Leader [Name removed] together with both medics and 7 deminers took the 
victim to the Central District Hospital in Rasht by [International demining group] ambulance. I, 
together with 5 deminers, remained and went back to the campsite. I wrote the statement 
myself and have nothing to add. 
Signed: 22 August, 2006 
  
Statement no.6: Section leader, MAT 1 
On 21 August, 2006 I, [Name removed], Section leader, MAT 1 woke up at 04:30. I put on my 
PPE. After listening to the safety briefing from my supervisor, I signed the Safety Briefings 
Logbook and walked over to the minefield. I cleared the mined area at my lane for 50 
minutes. Then we had a 10-minute break. After 15-20 minutes after the break, I heard an 
explosion and ordered the deminers to stop mine clearance. I immediately went towards the 
mine victim. We evacuated him from the minefield and took him to the medic. I wrote the 
statement myself and have nothing to add.  
Signed: 21 August, 2006 
 
Statement no.7: deminer from MAT 1 
On 21 August 2006 I, [Name removed], woke up at 04:30. I put on my PPE. After listening to 
the safety briefing from my supervisor I signed the Safety Briefings Logbook and walked to 
the minefield to my lane and fixed the tapes which were opened due to the wind. Then, I 
began mine clearance. Later the Team Leader came and tested my cleared lane with a mine 
detector. In Approx. 15-20 min. after the break, there was an explosion and I saw how 
deminer [the Victim] was thrown about one metre away from where he was working. The 
Team Leader ordered the deminers to stop mine clearance. I closed my lane and went 
towards the mine victim. The Team Leader instructed us to place the victim on the stretcher 
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and evacuated him from the minefield up to the medic. I wrote the statement myself and have 
nothing to add.  
Signed: 21 August, 2006  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because it seems that the 
Victim encountered an unusual situation with a mine placed in a cleft between rocks. Instead 
of asking for instructions, he raised his visor and worked on the mine from directly above, so 
putting his face inside the fragmentation cone associated with an AP mine blast.  
The secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the Victim had raised 
his visor and begun to work in a very dangerous position but his errors were not corrected. 
The fact that the International demining group did not have SOPs for the situation and had not 
revised their SOPs as required after previous accidents is a significant “Management control 
inadequacy”. The fact that the SOPs had still not been revised over a year later adds to the 
impression of an uncaring/incompetent management team. 
The Victim was a 19 year old conscript soldier, with the physique of a boy, as illustrated in the 
arm injury shown below. 
 
It is unfortunate that pictures of the accident investigation show International demining group 
expatriate investigators at the site wearing no PPE. This obviously sets a very bad example. 
They were inside a partly cleared minefield and – according to National standards and the 
demining group’s SOPs – should have been wearing PPE. The BoI investigators all wore PPE 
at the accident scene. 
The International demining group investigators below are on the rocky outcrop where the 
accident occurred. The fact that they gave the picture to the BoI implies that they did not know 
that they were in breach of their own SOPs. 
 
The “Inadequate medical provision” listed under Notes refers to the fact that no CASEVAC 
practice had been conducted and the Supervisor did not know how to react when the accident 
occurred. He sent a “runner” down the mountain to the hospital rather than use his telephone. 
This BoI is unusually thorough and one of the best on record. If it has a failing, it is that the 
National Authority displayed an unusual degree of patience over the failure of the 
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International demining group involved to take its previous post-accident requirements 
seriously. The demining group was the only one operating in-country and there was an 
understandable reluctance to suspend its operations. 
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